In this paper, I try to show and emphasise how China has adopted alternative economic policies in the transition and in the evolution of its financial system. In fact, the 'step by step' or 'gradualism' approach followed is in contrast to the fashionable idea that indiscriminately prescribes market-oriented financial system architecture to emerging and transition economies, and is, I believe, more close to the financial policies recommended by Post-Keynesians.
INTRODUCTION
The orthodox and dominant view in economic policy recommended a reform programme for transition and developing countries in the form of 'shock therapy' approach or 'big bang' under the assumption that "one size fits all" (cf. Kolodko, 1999; McMillan, 1994; McMillan and Naughton, 1992) . Shock therapy was the results of the Washington Consensus: the consensus achieved in Washington among the United States Treasury, the IMF, and the World Bank (cf. Williamson, 2000) . As a matter of fact, this approach emphasised that the best modus operandi for developing and transition economies were liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation in all sectors of the economy (cf. Stiglitz, 2002; Marangos, 2003, p.451) ; that is, unfettered free market, a reduce role for institutions and state and immediate integration into the international economic and financial system are the most important policies goals.
Post-Keynesians, in contrast, recommended different economic policies reforms for transition economies than the ones suggested by the mainstream (cf. Marangos, 2003 Marangos, , p.450, 2004 , p.455):
gradual price liberalisation, which involved maintaining fixed prices and wages and subsidies, government intervention to stimulate investment and incomes; discretionary monetary policy as essential measures to reduce unemployment; provision of appropriate incentives and regulation for the development of a healthy financial system and use of discretionary power to restructure the banks, prior to privatisation.
In this paper, I try to show and emphasise how China has adopted alternative economic policies in the transition and in the evolution of its financial system. 1 In fact, the 'step-by-step' or 3 The paper is structured as following: in Section 1, we consider and overview the literature dedicated to the analysis of the relevance of the financial architecture and to the comparison of different financial systems; in Section 2, we go on to the origin and development of the reforms in the Chinese system, highlighting the aspects of gradualism; in Section 3, we analyse the evolution of the financial system in China; finally, we draw our conclusions.
WHY FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE MATTERS?
As well-known, the post-Keynesian view refuses the dichotomy between the real and financial sectors of the economy; on the contrary, money and finance are integral in the understanding of the economy, that is, financial structure matters for real decisions (cf. Minsky, 1986 ; Arestis and Howells, 1992; Fazzari and Papadimitriou, 1992 ).
Financial architecture is traditionally the mix of institutions, tools and markets that characterises a country's financial system. 3 Consideration of this aspect becomes crucial once we depart from the 'ideal world' of Arrow-Debreu 4 to analyse a concrete economy characterised by fundamental uncertainty, incomplete markets, the presence of onerous transaction costs, imperfect and asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders to the firm -all quite striking aspects, especially when we consider an emerging and transition country like China.
Fundamental uncertainty and informational problems are indeed more accentuated in emerging and transition countries than in developed countries (Cf. Levine, 1997; Mishkin, 1996; Sau, 2003) .
Indeed, the transitional process raises a specific 'transitional uncertainty' due to institutional and structural transformation of the economy. This is because the post-Keynesian financial policy recommendations are most useful to the transition economies than the orthodox prescriptions (cf. Marangos, 2004, p.442 ).
The financial system performs a number of functions: it mobilises saving, allows for the diversification and sharing of risk; it produces and disseminates information; it allows for the monitoring of managers and enhances corporate governance; and it facilitates investments and innovation. Thus, we see depending on the financial system both efficiency in the allocation of resources and the stability of the economic system (cf. The two topologies of financial structure are in fact taken to be alternative, having found application in such different economic systems as those of Germany and Japan (bank-based systems), on the one hand, and the USA and the UK (market-based systems), on the other.
Upholders of the bank-based view lay particular stress on the way a monetary economy 5 develops thanks above all top the action of coordination guaranteed by the presence of certain institutions, among which banks play a decisive role. In fact, the banks play a very special and indeed central informative role (Stiglitz, 1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988) : they are the 'social accountants'; they perform the activities of screening potential clients and monitoring in the case of clients obtaining credit; finally, they not only acquire but also produce information. 6 However, advocates of the market-based view stress the virtues of particularly extensive, widespread and liquid financial markets (in shares, bonds and private equity; (cf. Boot and Thakor, 1997; Allen and Gale, 1999). In fact, it is these that most favour the financing and constitution of new firms and, thus, of the more innovative projects.
Nevertheless, the post-Keynesian approach to transition emphasises (cf. Marangos,2004, p.445) that the reforms necessary for each market economy could only be determined country by country. This recommendation is valid also for the implementation of the financial system. Therefore, the 'optimal' financial architecture should not to be viewed in a static way as it depends on a set of country-specific factors in a given period, including particularly: a) the level of uncertainty, incompleteness and asymmetry of information marking the economic system (cf. "in transition economies, institutions essential to market economy were either distorted or did not exist, and market behaviour was unfamiliar or immature. Market institutions had to be developed from scratch."
As we will see in the following sections, we hold this approach to be particularly significant in that it helps us to appreciate the reasons why China still has a largely bank-based financial system and is moving only gradually towards effective boosting of the national financial markets and opening up to the international financial markets.
GRADUALISM IN THE REFORMS OF THE CHINESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
In this section, the focus is on the origin and development of the complex of intermediaries and markets characterising the Chinese financial system. Here, we have an evolution that is still in progress and that was launched as a result of the implementation of gradual reforms brought in as from the end of the 1970s to the present day.
With regard to the banking system, we must take a backward glance and recall that the advent of As to the stock markets, they only came into operation as from the 90s, the introduction of these markets launch as second 'pillar' of the financial system. Gradual elimination of a number of the constraints on private property opened the way for the rise of many private or quasi-private firms and gradually opened channels for savings to find some use other than deposit into the banks.
As noted above, official activation of the two 'national' stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), took place at the beginning of the early 90s, in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Alongside these, the Hong Kong "selling state enterprises to the highest bidder,…,violated equity principles … The only people who could purchase firms were those who had benefited under the previous regime through the black-market and illegal activities or foreigners."
Furthermore "it is the responsibility of the government to use discretionary measures to ensure the viability of the enterprises before and after privatisation" (cf. Marangos, 2003) . In fact, the shock therapy experience in Russia suggested indeed that immediate privatisation of all state enterprises was not the best modus operandi to proceed (cf. Bucknall, 1997) . 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE IN CHINA
Having reviewed the main reforms that have affected the Chinese financial system, in this section, we will analyse the structure of the system and attempt to illustrate the evolution in the relative importance taken on by the various forms of financing. Here, we must consider the contributions To this end, on the evidence of the total bank credit in ratio with the GDP (bank credit ratio), we can without a shadow of a doubt confirm that the incidence of the banking system within the Chinese financial structure is indeed significant, actually exceeding unity: (1.11) (cf. 2002: Table   3A ). However, when we turn to the figure for credit supplied to the hybrid sector (i.e., nonstate and non-listed firms), as it is called, the value plunges (0.24), demonstrating that the majority of bank loans supplied by the Chinese banks went to SOE or listed firms (as emphasised by Allen et al., 2007) .
In the case of the stock market, the situation in 2002 proves the reverse: in fact, China registers a ratio of no more than 0.32 (32%) (market capitalisation ratio). The result drops to 0.11 (11%) if we consider the 'floating supply' of the market in ratio with the GDP (i.e., float supply ratio or total value traded ratio). The latter datum proves particularly significant in that, unlike the total capitalisation, the floating supply is equal to the value of shares that are exchanged on the market (cf. 2002: Table 3A) .
We are aware of the fact that simple comparison between the data taking into account the volume of total credit supplied and the total stock market capitalisation (in ratio to the GDP) are not, however, sufficient to draw conclusions on the relative importance assumed by the banks in comparison with the stock market within the Chinese financial system; in fact, that is, that the structure is bank-based rather than market-based.
In this respect, their analysis is extended to take into consideration the Structure Indices, as they are termed. Now, if we consider the index that measures 'Structure Activity', obtained on the basis of the Log (float supply ratio/bank credit ratio), and the index that measures the 'Structure Size', obtained, in turn, with Log (market capitalisation ratio/bank credit ratio), we get for China: (-2.31) and (-1.24) (cf. Table 3B ). Since the higher the measure, the more the system is market-based, the last two data (i.e., structure size and structure activity) point to some significant conclusions on the predominance of the bank sector over the stock market in the Chinese financial system. In fact, as we have seen, in terms of both volume and indexes, the Chinese financial structure has been dominated by the role of the banks and, as noted in Section 2, above all the state banks (i.e., SOBs).
If one consider the role played by the entire financial system rather than taking the roles of the banks and the financial markets separately, in compliance with Allen et al. (2007) , we get indices for the overall development of the financial system (i.e., financial development indices).
The finance-activity index is obtained on the basis of Log (float supply ratio × private credit ratio).
The finance-size index is obtained considering Log (total market capitalisation ratio × private credit ratio). The two indexes prove somewhat low especially in terms of finance size (-2.56) (cf. 2002: Table 3C ). On the basis of the indexes dealt with above, we can now survey the evolution that has taken place within the structure of the Chinese financial system, taking into account the period subsequent to stock market reform starting on April 2005. As we have seen (cf. Section 2 and "The ultimate irony is that many of the countries that have taken a more gruadualist policy have succeeded in making deeper reforms more rapidly. China's stock market is larger than Russia's."
CONCLUSION
As well-known, in the last 30 years China's economic reforms followed successful gradualist or step-by-step approach 16 that are in contrast with the shock therapy policies adopted by many other transition countries suggested, and very often imposed, by the Washington Consensus.
Starting from this finding, in this paper, we set out to show that this is true also in the implementation of its financial system architecture. These reforms have been applied in various ways at various times, dealing first with the banking system, then with the stock market and finally shaping the financial markets, in the broad sense, subsequent to joining by China to the WTO.
From the theoretical point of view, this gradual reform process contained elements, we believe, of the post-Keynesians approach to transition (cf. Marangos, 2003 Marangos, , 2004 Marangos, , 2006 . Indeed, the financial structure of a country is not be seen in static terms as it depends on a series of specific factors that must of necessity be taken into account. Whenever a country's legal and institutional systems have seen little development, with serious problems in transitional uncertainty and asymmetry of information -all of which are very evident aspects when we consider a developing country like China -it will be preferable to begin by boosting a bank-based financial system and work in the direction of further development of the financial markets (i.e., market-based financial system) only when these specific factors show real improvement. The shock therapy experience adopted by many transition countries (Bulgaria, 1991; Russia, 1992, Albania, 1992; Estonia, 1992 etc.) revealed that it was a mistake to assume that state enterprises and banks would adjust immediately to market principles (cf. Stiglitz, 2004; Marangos, 2004, p.446 ).
These findings are borne out by applied analysis performed elaborating on the basis of the contributions by Allen et al. (2007) . In fact, on the evidence of the structure indexes, we can only conclude that the Chinese financial system had long been totally bank-base but that it is now developing and slowly evolving towards a more market-based system: for these aspects China is indeed an interesting case study.
Nevertheless, the gradual process described above has ensured, at present time, a certain social and macroeconomic stability but has not prevented problems of financial fragility from arising in the banking sector and problems of corporate governance for the firms (cf. OECD, 2005; Yueh, 2004), which need to be addressed without delay. 17 These aspects are beyond the aim of this paper and need further reflections and investigations for other works. 2 Whether the policy decision-makers, were, or not, aware of this aspect is an intriguing question.
Nevertheless it is important to point out that, despite the analogies stressed in this paper between China's financial system evolution and Post Keynesians' financial policies, the political transition 
